International regimes

A set of rules, norms, and procedures around

which the expectations of actors converge in
a certain international issue area (such as
oceans or monetary policy).
International regimes
• Achieving good outcomes is not simple, though. Because of the contradictory interpretations that parties to a
conflict usually have, it is difficult to resolve conflicts without a third party to arbitrate or an overall
framework to set common expectations for all parties. These considerations underlie the creation of IOs.

• The convergence of expectations means that participants in the international system have similar ideas about
what rules will govern their mutual participation: Each expects to play by the same rules.

• Regimes can help solve collective goods problems by increasing transparency— because everyone knows
what everyone else is doing, cheating is riskier.
International regimes
• Because regimes depend on state power for their
enforcement, some IR scholars argue that
regimes are most effective when power in the
international system is most concentrated—
when there is a hegemon to keep order.
Example:
HEALTH REGIME International regimes are sets of rules,
norms, and procedures, not always codified into institutions,
that govern the behavior of actors in IR. The world health
regime includes states, IGOs such as the World Health
Organization (WHO), nonprofit organizations such as the
Gates Foundation, and others, all working with common
expectations about activities to improve health and stem
epidemics. Here, a UNICEF staff member vaccinates a child
against measles after a devastating cyclone hit Vanuatu in
2015.
Collective Security
• The formation of a broad alliance of most major actors
in an international system for the purpose of jointly
opposing aggression by any actor; sometimes seen as
presupposing the existence of a universal organization
(such as the United Nations) to which both the
aggressor and its opponents belong. See also League of
Nations
Collective Security
• After the horrors of World War I, the League of Nations was
formed to promote collective security. But it was flawed in
two ways. Its membership did not include all the great
powers (including the most powerful one, the United States),
and its members proved unwilling to bear the costs of
collective action to oppose aggression
Collective Security
• The United Nations was created as the League’s successor to
promote collective security.

• Several regional IGOs also currently perform collective

security functions (deterring aggression) as well as economic
and cultural ones—the Organization of American States
(OAS), the Arab League, and the African Union.
Collective Security
The success of collective security depends on two points. First, the members must keep their alliance
commitments to the group (that is, members must not free-ride on the efforts of other members). When a
powerful state commits aggression against a weaker one, it often is not in the immediate interest of other
powerful states to go to war over the issue. Suppressing a determined aggressor can be very costly.
Collective Security
• A second requisite for collective security is that enough members must
agree on what constitutes aggression. The UN Security Council is
structured so that aggression is defined by what all five permanent
members, in addition to at least four of the other ten members, can agree
on.

• This collective security system does not work against aggression by a

great power. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, or the United
States mined the harbors of Nicaragua, or France blew up the
Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior, the UN could do nothing— because
those states can veto Security Council resolutions.
Collective Security
• Collective security worked in 1990–1991 to reverse Iraq’s conquest of
Kuwait because the aggression brought all the great powers together
and because they were willing to bear the costs of confronting Iraq.

• The invasion was so blatant a violation of Kuwaiti sovereignty and

territorial integrity that the Security Council had little trouble labeling
it aggression and authorizing the use of force by a multinational
coalition. The threat Iraq posed to the world’s oil supplies provided
additional incentive for coalition members to contribute money or
troops to solve the problem.