Professional Documents
Culture Documents
itech 3203_08 lecture
itech 3203_08 lecture
itech 3203_08 lecture
Week 8
Freedom of Speech &
Systems Reliability
ITECH 3203-7203
Professional Development
Commonwealth of Australia Copyright Act 1968
Notice for paragraph 135ZXA (a) of the Copyright Act 1968
Warning
This Material has been reproduced and communicated to you by or on behalf of Federation University Australia under Part
VB of the Copyright Act 1968 (the Act).
The Material in this communication may be subject to copyright under the Act. Any further reproduction or communication
of this material by you may be the subject of copyright protection under the Act.
Do not remove this notice.
Content of Course ...
Section Topics
1. Ethical • utilitarianism & character based
theories deontology • professional ethics
• contract-based &
2. Social impact • privacy & security • social issues
technology • cybercrime, IP & • Internet & systems
copyright reliability
Citizens of cyberspace
Netiquette
Managing the Internet
Freedom of speech and censorship
Filtering
Systems failures: TRELIS, Sydney Water, RMIT, One Tel,
Therac-25 etc.
Faculty of Science and Technology
Citizens of cyberspace
Introduction
Issues to consider …
•Should there be total freedom of expression on the
Internet?
•Should Internet content be controlled?
•Should there be a balance?
•If so, how are controls to be implemented?
•What is the role of governments and other significant
groups?
Citizens of Cyberspace
Definitions of netizen
• Anyone who uses the Internet
• Any person who:
• cares the Internet is used cooperatively
• sees the Internet for communication available and to benefit
all
Netiquette
Netiquette
Significant features
• Real self or virtual self
• No geographic boundaries
• Information is free
Concerns
• Content distressing and unrestricted
e.g. violence, racial hatred, emotive imagery
• Cyber-related crime
Internet Governance
continued…
Concerns continued…
• Freedom of speech
• highly valued in individualistic cultures e.g. Australia
Avenues of regulation
• Regulation by the state
• may involve an independent regulatory body
• Self-regulation
• a significant group, such as an industry, agrees to take the
responsibility for regulation
• Co-regulation
• self-regulation with a state regulator as a watchdog
Internet Governance
continued…
Attempts at regulation
Multi-Stakeholder Approach
Issues to consider …
Systems failures
Systems Unreliability???
Issues to consider:
•Why do IT systems fail?
•Why does the profession as a whole appear not to learn
from past errors?
Systems fail
Causes range from simple power outages to major system
errors
Extreme consequences include:
•Massive inconvenience
•Large financial disasters
•Loss of life
Expectations
Issues to consider:
•Is system failure abnormal, out-of-the-ordinary, exceptional
or is it to be regarded as part of normal life?
•Is bug-free software an unobtainable ideal?
•Are systems becoming too complex for limited human
intelligence?
•Are our expectations too high?
Problem Sources
Facts:
•Introduced a new Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)
system in 2005.
•A$17 million was written off.
•Changeover from the legacy system used the staggered
approach in order to handle the complexity.
Problems:
•Discrepancies in the system conversion.
TRELIS Project
Facts:
•WA’s transport licensing system.
•Two years behind schedule, cost $82.2 m.
•On go-live data validation and processing errors.
•Result 22,000 transactions entered manually.
Problems:
• Inadequate controls on software quality
• Non-compliance with design standards
• Insufficient technical knowledge
• Time and cost pressures
Sydney Water
Facts:
•Customer billing system
• Abandoned after estimated costs went from A$38m to
A$135m
Problems:
• 6000 test problems 8 months after planned go-live date
• Lack of IT architecture for the organisation
• Non-compliance in 19/20 requirements
• Testing neither timely nor comprehensive
RMIT (Melbourne)
Facts:
• Student management system
• Scrapped after costs had increased nearly fourfold
A$12.6m to A$47m
• Problems with enrolments, billing, issuing HECS
statements, fulfilling reporting requirements
Problems:
• Data integrity compromised
• No PM or SDLC methodology used
• Inadequate testing
Customs Integrated Cargo System
Facts:
• System set up to process cargo entering and leaving
Australia (10-year overhaul)
• Customers required by law to use it
• Sydney & Melbourne ports at a standstill
• Huge fees for operators affected by delays
• Quarantine and security waived temporarily
• Help line inundated with calls
Problems:
• Faulty data returned by system
• Poor software, testing, training
The Edge Project
Facts:
• Joint project between government departments
• Expert system to improve quality of Centrelink (income
security) assessment decisions
• Previous system (ISIS) more reliable, new system scrapped
after 4 years – over budget, over time
• Expenditure more than A$60m
• Problems government departments working together
Problems:
• Delays in connecting Edge with the mainframe system and
ISIS
A Financial Disaster
Facts:
• Billing system
• Business growth brought serious delays and many bills
had errors
• Waiting times at the call centre unacceptable
• Extra A$120m cash to cover gap caused by delays
• Eventually the company closed down
Problems:
• Built in-house by inexperienced programmers using an
inadequate design and testing
International Examples
Facts:
•Dispatch system
•Manual system automated to deal with problems of
identifying incident locations, form handling and vehicle
status information
• Errors in recording vehicle information resulted in
inefficient dispatch and fewer resources
• Resulted in message queues expanding and response
times lengthening
• Delays resulted in repeat calls and bottlenecks
London Ambulance Service
continued…
Problems:
• Company supplying the bulk of the software had no
experience in this area
• Prescribed public sector project management method
not used i.e. (PRINCE)
• Software: incomplete, under-tested, poor user
interfaces, not robust, had errors
• Specifications contained unjustified assumptions
• Implementation high-risk, training poor
• Timetable too ambitious
Therac-25
Facts:
• Computer-controlled radiation machines made dose-rate
errors
• Patient deaths and injuries resulted
• Machines were kept in use
Problems:
• Poor hardware safety mechanisms
• Code reuse with software bugs
• Meaningless error messages
• Little documentation
Why Are Mistakes Repeated?
Consider …
• How many individuals and/or organisations think they are
ok and it is others with the problems?
• Are current methodologies satisfactory?
• Are guiding codes for the profession adequate?
• If the notion of error-free systems is an ideal rather than a
possibility, should this affect what systems are attempted?
• What warnings should be given to an increasingly aware
public?
Questions needing Answers