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07 - 3pm - Current Trends in Compensation - McIntosh and Yerre - Slides
07 - 3pm - Current Trends in Compensation - McIntosh and Yerre - Slides
07 - 3pm - Current Trends in Compensation - McIntosh and Yerre - Slides
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Todays Agenda
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2010
FRB: Final Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies (June) Congress: Dodd-Frank Act o Say on pay, say on pay frequency, say on parachutes o Compensation committee independence o CEO pay ratio disclosure o Pay for performance disclosure o Recovery of executive compensation (clawbacks) o Executive hedging o Enhanced disclosure of incentives for financial institutions Global regulators: Capital Requirements Directive III and related territory guidance
2011
SEC: Rulemaking on Dodd-Frank provisions: Say on pay provisions (January) Guidance to exchanges on compensation committee independence (March) FRB, FDIC, OCC, OTS, SEC, NCUA, FLHMA: Incentive-based Compensation Arrangements (April) Other rulemaking not scheduled before August 2011: o CEO pay ratio disclosure o Pay for performance disclosure o Clawback policies o Executive hedging
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Say On Pay Preparation Reflections on 2011 proxy season Companies have modified practices for say on pay right up until the vote
Disclosure
- CD&A executive summary focusing on pay for performance, risk alignment, peer groups, severance/change in control, executive benefits, and governance
- Pay for performance supplemental disclosures Program changes - Elimination of gross up provisions and other executive benefits - Establishment of performance conditions on long-term incentive grants Shareholder Engagement - Proxy advisor rebuttals - Institutional shareholder outreach
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Say On Pay Results Early returns Most companies Fortune 100 companies (15 as of 4/29): are receiving a - Yes votes (14): strong majority Median 93% in favor of say on pay 25th percentile 82% in favor votes in favor of - No votes (1): 48% in favor compensation
Broad sample (503 as of 4/29) - 98% received majority in favor - 2% (11 companies) received majority no votes
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Say On Pay Frequency Results Early returns Annual votes are preferred by shareholders and increasingly recommended by companies
Company Recommendations Annual Biennial Triennial Fortune 100 60% 1% 30% Broad Sample 51% 3% 43%
No recommendation*
Sample size
9%
75
3%
2,177
- What methods of engagement will companies use outside the annual proxy statement?
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Manager
Larger % of overall pay Smaller % of overall pay Generally available to all senior management and most managers but may be tied to performance of company overall, business unit, and/or individual metrics.
Long-term Incentives
Larger % of overall pay Generally available to all execs May be in multiple forms (e.g., stock, options, cash, etc.)
Smaller % of overall pay Availability depends on company but most managers and higher eligible Limited in forms
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Manager
Eligible for company-wide plans
Eligible for company-wide plans May also be eligible for NQDC Less prevalent Not prevalent
Perquisites Severance/CIC
* Many benefits which have been historically executive-only are on the decline with many companies completely eliminating them.
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Overall Trends
Overall, compensation trends have been focused on:
Performance measurement
Compensation risk Elements of remuneration - Elimination of executive benefits (e.g., SERPs, perquisites)
- Focus on severance periods, single trigger change in control benefits, tax gross-ups
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Todays Perspectives
Pay-for-performance models are under increasing scrutiny from US policymakers and their global counterparts. Collective goal is to ensure that compensation does not put the long term health of businesses and the overall economy at undue risk. - Not just banks and financial services institutions US lawmakers and regulators want to lessen companies emphasis on shortterm performance. - Want greater disclosure about how public companies' compensation policies might precipitate events that businesses don't have the financial wherewithal to withstand.
New guidance will force companies to take a much broader view of both performance and risk.
- If viewed as an opportunity, rather than just a compliance exercise, companies may derive long-term benefits from the pay-for performance model's evolution.
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Putting compensation "at risk" for longer periods so that the timing of incentive pay and performance are not misaligned.
- May pose challenges for companies in light of recent tax rule changes. Greater disclosure on risk and reward may inform shareholder views/votes on compensation decisions.
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Redefining Performance
In their effort to address the various complex causes of the financial crisis, policymakers have been contemplating the role corporate pay packages played. - The result is compensation guidance from multiple agencies. Collectively, the guidance aims to ensure that compensation policies do not promote behavior that could put companiesand, by extension, marketsin jeopardy. To this end, policymakers want corporate compensation plans to take risk and long-term performance into greater account.
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Redefining Performance
Regulator/shareholder tension Some shareholders have traditionally focused on short-term returns, paying less attention to long-term value creation and risk. - This was particularly evident in the run-up to the financial crisis. Various companies that have fared relatively well in the wake of the crisis were criticized by shareholders (one to two years earlier) for not playing more aggressively in the subprime loan market. Many policymakers argue that the interests of such shareholders are not necessarily aligned with the interests of the general public and the goal of market stability. The new guidance attempts to bring those interests into balance.
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Redefining Performance
Pressure on boards Shareholders are beginning to bring about some of that balance themselves, post-crisis, giving greater consideration to the long-term corporate health of the companies they invest in. As a result, shareholders' usual pressure on boards to show a demonstrable and explicit link between pay and performance may start to shift in emphasisso that the long-term view of performance is stressed as much as the short-term view. Indeed, certain institutional investors (e.g., pension funds) have long made this their policy. Such pressure will be easier to apply if Congress requires public companies to grant shareholders a nonbinding advisory vote on executive pay ("say on pay").
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Redefining Performance
Pressure on boards (Contd) Boards also continue to confront public pressure, with negative sentiment about executive pay potentially diminishing corporate reputation and value. And, there may be pressure from within the board itself: - Although much of the new compensation guidance is directed at banks and other financial institutions, its core elements are likely to migrate to other sectors through cross-directorships and broader director education.
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Companies focusing more on finding and motivating the right talent to support the companys business strategy
May be driven outside of HR if not a strategic partner
Understand how management is reshaping the skills and size of the companys workforce in light of its strategy and todays economic conditions
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2011 PwC. All rights reserved. In this document, "PwC" refers to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership, which is a member firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited, each member firm of which is a separate legal entity. This document is for general information purposes only, and should not be used as a substitute for consultation with professional advisors.