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Crown, Cork and Seal in 1989
Crown, Cork and Seal in 1989
One of the Worlds leading packaging manufacturers Makers of 1 out of every 5 beverage cans in the World Also produces aerosol cans, specialty packaging, can ends and crowns 223 mfg. plants situated in 49 countries 60% of revenues from outside US
An Idea for better bottle cap gives rise to Crown, Cork And Seal Company 1891 Bought By Competitor Charles McCanus due to bankruptcy following patent expiry 1927
1930
Target Markets
Domestic niche in growth segments International Pioneer rights Exits Motor Oil Can Market
Financial Control
Reduce debt No Cash dividends Stock Repurchase
Manufacturing
Small plants located close to customer Process innovation\cost reduction Just in Time
R&D
Work closely with customers Not expend heavily on R&D
Marketing
Close ties with customers Provide technical assistance at customers plant
Represented 61% of packaged products in US in 1989 Included cans, crowns, screw caps, bottle lids etc for industrial and consumer goods During 1980s Aluminium can growth averaged 8% annually while steel shipment fell by average 3.1% per year Aluminum took over steel in 1980 - 89
In-house Manufacturing
Captive Plants (25% of total can output) Followed by large brewers to reduce costs, but not widespread in soft-drink sector
Plastics
Initially showed great growth due to light weight, handling convenience resulting in customer acceptance Challenges - Manufacturing difficulty, Carbonation retention, preventing oxygen penetration, recycling problem resulted in slow growth post 1987 Market comprised mostly of small players with few exceptions e.g. Owens Illionis
Glass
Lost cost advantage on plastic due to rising resin costs Metal was preferred for cans due to logistical, economic, transportation benefits etc
Customers
Coca-Cola, Pepsico, Anheuser Busch etc
Distribution
Cost Components Raw Material, Direct Labour, Transport Manufacturing plants located close to customers to minimize transport costs Aluminum was preferred over steel due to low shipping costs
Suppliers
Largest Aluminium Producers Alcoa, Alcan, Reynolds Metals
Diversification across
Spectrum of Rigid Containers to supply major end-users (Foods,
American Can Insurance, ultimately selling off can business to Triangle Industries Continental Energy Exploration, Research, Transportation National Can Glass Containers, Canning etc Ball Corporation HighTechnology Market
Challenges
Newly appointed CEO Growth Slow down in metal containers 1977: Ozone controversy & trends towards legislative regulation of non returnable containers was threatening Crowns business Plastic was only growing segment Problems in merger of America Can and National Can
Plastic
Glass
Light weight
Light weight
Compact for inventory Transportation efficiency Beer category had love affair with long neck bottles
CC&S American National ($ mm) % of Sales ($ mm) % of Sales ($ mm) % of Sales 1298 100% 3346.4 100% 1647.5 100% 1116 86% 2721 81% 1432.2 87% 182 14% 625.4 19% 215.3 13% 43.1 3% 501.8 15% 121.8 7% 138.9 11% 123.6 4% 93.5 6%
CCS has higher operating income as compared to its competitors Low investment in R&D has resulted in higher ROE for CCS (Exhibit 5)
Supplier Power 3 major Al suppliers, so more concentration of suppliers Acquisition of Continental Cans would reduce Suppliers bargaining power in the metal can industry
Buyer Power
Buyers pose a credible threat of backward integration Products are indifferent, so buyers face no switching cost Buyers are large and buy in large quantities Continental acquisition would increase its market share thereby reducing buyer bargaining power Threat of Substitutes Threat of Substitutes would be reduced by diversification into plastic containers
Potential Entrants Low capital investment No switching cost and brand loyalty Acquisition of Continental would further increase economies of scale Access to newer distribution channels Industry Competitors Continental has a market share of 18% in the metal can industry as compared to CCSs 7%. So the acquisition would reduce competition for CCS
Strengths
Just in time delivery Located close to customer High quality Customer driven High profit margins Low costs Focus on specialized product lines International sales
Weaknesses
Rely on metal can, not diversified Smaller than its competitors Few R&D initiatives No.4 in US
Opportunities
Threats
Backward and forward integration by buyers and suppliers Little growth in metal can industry Customer base decreasing Price pressure
To be market leader can maker Expand globally High potentials of growth Few competitors High operating margins(sales 44%, profit 54%)
Post Acquisition : Double the sales to $ 3.6 billion Analysts expect demand to increase from the soft drink business CCS current debt to equity ratio is 12% which would rise to 38% post the acquisition But the repayment of debt for the acquisition should be easy Connelly frugality and Crowns strong cash flow As a result of the acquisition, stock price could rise to $70
Parenting Matrix
Ballast Business Heartland Businesses (CCS acquisition of Continental Can Company)
Fe el Alien Business
Benefi t
Buy out/ merge with opposition Diversify into plastic and glass business Recruit / develop knowledge base of the plastic industry Pursue alternative customers Research and development Migrate current principles & strategies into growing markets
William Avery CEO- 1989 1990 consolidation acquired Continental Can 1992 entered into plastic container industry acquired Constar & became leader in PET products ( plastic ) 1993 food canning acquired Van Dorn 1996 packaging acquired Carnuad Metalbox